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Abstract. We quantise the generalised Hawk-Dove Game. By restricting the
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1. Introduction
Von Neumann & Morgenstern (1947) introduced a theory of games in their paper
The Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour. Although their intention was to
build a theory for predicting economic variation, the field of game theory has since
found a diverse range of unforeseen applications from political science (Boyd &
Richerson 1992) to evolutionary biology (Nowak & Sigmund 1999). Games such as
the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) (Poundstone 2011) and the Hawk-Dove Game (HDG)
(Maynard Smith 1982) have proved successful models in evolutionary biology to explain
the growth of selfish and aggressive behaviours within a population of a species
respectively.
Meyer (1999) inspired the extension of this theory by asking, “What happens if
these games are generalised into the quantum realm?” The field of quantum game
theory was consequentially established by Eisert et al. (1999). They reasoned that
quantum games may already be played on a molecular level where quantum mechanics
dictates the rules. As game theory involves the communication of information (such as
a player communicating their choice of strategy to the game’s arbiter), we can think
about this information as quantum information (as we live in a quantum world), thus
providing a natural link between game theory and quantum information theory. They
also highlight how the presence of phenomena such as entanglement and superposition
can drastically change the observed dynamics in this new framework. Examples include
the original dilemma present in the classical PD being removed under the quantisation
of the game when the two players have access to a specific two-parameter strategy space
(Eisert & Wilkens 2000). Du et al. (2001) have since demonstrated the first physical
realisation of a quantum game using a nuclear magnetic resonance quantum computer.
It is these types of new results that spur the continued interest in the field of quantum
game theory.
In this paper we quantise the generalised Hawk-Dove Game (HDG). By considering
the entanglement of the initial state we show that a unique threshold of entanglement
can be derived for the onset of a Pareto optimal evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) for
every game of this type. We start with an introduction to the classical HDG, followed
by a quantisation of the generalised HDG following the work of Eisert et al. (1999).
2. The Classical Hawk-Dove Game
This game was originally formulated by Maynard Smith (1982) to model the evolution of
aggressive genes within a species. He imagined a species who meet pairwise to compete
over a resource of value, v. In this contest an individual has the choice of two actions.
It may either be aggressive (hawk), or non-aggressive (dove).
When hawk is played against dove, the dove will flee before risking an injury, leaving
the resource, v, to the hawk. If both choose dove they display to each other with a small
cost, d (effort or time), and one takes the resource. If both choose hawk they attack
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each other, one sustaining a large injury, i, with the other taking the resource, v. This
leads to the symmetric pay-off matrix shown in table 1.
H D
H (v
2
− i
2
, v
2
− i
2
) (v, 0)
D (0, v) (v
2
- d, v
2
- d)
Table 1. The pay-off matrix for the Hawk-Dove Game. The expected pay-offs for the
“row player” are the left-hand entries, the expected pay-offs for the “column player”
are the right-hand entries.
As is standard, and indeed intuitive, we assume the hierarchy of values to be,
0 < 2d < v < i. (1)
These conditions ensure hawks gain a negative expected pay-off when competing against
other hawks, while doves gain a positive expected pay-off when competing against other
doves.
The classical game gives rise to a mixed ESS (p∗, 1−p∗) (Maynard Smith 1982). This
mixed strategy is to play hawk with probability p∗ = v+2d
i+2d
. This equilibrium is inefficient
however, as the average pay-off received per round to an individual in a population with
this resident strategy is
(
i−v
i+2d
) (
v
2
− d) which is less than the non-aggressive, cooperative
pay-off of v
2
− d.
2.1. Quantisation
A few quantisations of this game have already been examined, including models by
Nawaz & Toor (2010) and Hanauske et al. (2010). Nawaz & Toor (2010) use a density
matrix quantisation approach to examine the conditions required on the initial state
for a pure strategy NE to exist, but do not investigate the entanglement of these initial
states. Hanauske et al. (2010) also use the model of Eisert et al. (1999) to show that
varying the entanglement in the system can produce non-aggressive ESSs. They only
consider three specific HDGs however, and only a few fixed values of entanglement. We
consider both generalised entanglement, and the most general HDG.
To quantise this game we use an analogous process to Eisert et al. (1999), shown in
figure 1. The process is as follows. We start by associating the states |0〉 and |1〉 with
Figure 1. The process I use to implement the quantum Hawk-Dove game.
the strategies dove and hawk respectively. We then assign one qubit in C2 to each player
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in the dove state. Hence we describe the state of the game at this point as |DD〉. This
allows us to associate quantum strategies with classical strategies. As a player wanting
to use the dove strategy does not want the state of their qubit to change, and a player
choosing the hawk strategy wishes to rotate the state of their qubit from |0〉 to |1〉, the
natural association of operators is,
Dˆ ∼
(
1 0
0 1
)
, Hˆ ∼
(
0 1
−1 0
)
. (2)
To generalise the entanglement in this game we use the entangling gate Jˆ(γ) =
eiγHˆ⊗Hˆ , where we have absorbed the usual power of 1/2 into gamma for simplicity. This
produces the initial state |ψi〉 = cos(γ)|DD〉+ i sin(γ)|HH〉.
Here γ ∈ [0, pi/4] can be viewed as a parameter of entanglement. If γ = 0
the initial state of the game is |ψi〉 = |DD〉, a product state. If γ = pi/4, |ψi〉 =
1√
2
(|DD〉+ i|HH〉) which is a maximally entangled state. Thus varying γ between 0
and pi/4 allows us to control the prepared entanglement in the initial state.
Once the qubits have been entangled the players select a unitary operator, UˆR ∈
SR ⊂ C2 × C2 (UˆC ∈ SC ⊂ C2 × C2) to apply to their qubit. Here SR (SC) is called
the row (column) player’s strategy space. After the application of these operators the
qubits are disentangled using the gate Jˆ† and the final state, |ψf〉, is measured. By
making a measurement in the computational basis the measured eigenvalues will be
either zero or one. A zero corresponds to the measurement of the state |0〉 = |D〉, i.e.
the corresponding player receives the pay-off for the classical dove strategy. Similarly
the eigenvalue one corresponds to the classical hawk strategy.
For simplicity we rewrite the pay-off matrix as,
H D
H (−a, −a) (b, 0)
D (0, b) (c, c)
Table 2. The simplified version of the pay-off matrix for the HDG shown in table 1,
where a = i2 − v2 , b = v and c = v2 − d, so a, b, c > 0.
2.2. Two-Parameter Strategy Space
We consider the specific case where each player has access to the two-parameter strategy
space, S. Thus SR = SC = S, where S contains all operators of the form,
Uˆ(θ, φ) =
(
eiφ cos(θ) sin(θ)
− sin(θ) e−iφ cos(θ)
)
(3)
with 0 ≤ θ ≤ pi/2 and 0 ≤ φ ≤ pi/2. Thus the row (column) player’s choice of strategy
is characterised by their choice of θR and φR (θC and φC).
This strategy space was originally constructed by Eisert et al. (1999) to show the
existence of a Pareto optimal NE for a maximally entangled game in the quantum
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Prisoner’s Dilemma. We now extend this to the quantum HDG to show the analogous
Pareto optimal ESS exists for all HDGs when the entanglement in the initial state, |ψi〉,
exceeds a threshold value which we determine.
It is important to observe that the classical game is necessarily contained within
this quantisation. By restricting the players to the strategies characterised by φ = 0,
a player’s choice of θ ∈ [0, pi/2] is a bijection to the choice of classical mixed strategies
characterised by p ∈ [0, 1].
We calculate the expected pay-off for the row player for generalised entanglement
in this two-parameter strategy space using the equation,
$R(θR, φR, θC , φC , γ) = cPDD + bPHD − aPHH , (4)
where Pσσ′ = |〈σσ′ |ψf〉|2 is the joint probability of measuring σ, σ′ ∈ {D,H}.
These equations yield the expected pay-off to the row player as,
$R(θR, φR, θC , φC , γ) = c| cos(θR) cos(θC)[cos(φR + φC) + i cos(2γ) sin(φR + φC)]|2
+b|2 cos(γ) sin(γ) sin(φR) cos(θR) sin(θC)− cos(φC) sin(θR) cos(θC)[1 + i cos(2γ)]|2
−a| sin(θR) sin(θC) + 2 cos(γ) sin(γ) sin(φR + φC) cos(θR) cos(θC)|2.
(5)
As this game is symmetric, the column player’s pay-off can be found by
interchanging the subscripts “R” and “C”. Note that these pay-offs depend on the
entanglement parameter γ.
We now show that (Qˆ, Qˆ) becomes an ESS iff, γc ≤ γ ≤ pi/4, where,
Qˆ = Uˆ(0, pi/2) =
(
i 0
0 −i
)
. (6)
I.e. this strategy Qˆ becomes the game’s new unique ESS when the entanglement in the
game exceeds the critical value, γc, which will be determined.
As this is a symmetric game, we can show (Qˆ, Qˆ) is a Nash equilibrium by showing
Qˆ is in the set of best responses to itself, B(Qˆ), when the entanglement in the game
exceeds γc.
Calculating the pay-off received against the strategy Qˆ using equation 5 and looking
for the critical values of φ and θ that maximise/minimise this pay-off gives the three
strategies Dˆ, Hˆ and Qˆ. From equation 5 the expected pay-offs these strategies yield
against Qˆ are,
$R(Dˆ, Qˆ, γ) = c− 4a cos2(γ) sin2(γ), (7)
$R(Qˆ, Qˆ, γ) = c, (8)
$R(Hˆ, Qˆ, γ) = b cos
2(2γ). (9)
Note that Qˆ is a best response to itself iff the pay-off,
$R(Qˆ, Qˆ, γ) ≥ $R(UˆR, Qˆ, γ), ∀UˆR ∈ S. (10)
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Figure 2. The expected pay-off to the row player when playing the strategies
Dˆ = Uˆ(0, 0) (dotted line), Hˆ = Uˆ(pi/2, 0) (dashed line) and Qˆ = Uˆ(0, pi/2) (solid
line) against a column player playing Qˆ, shown as a function of the entanglement
parameter γ. Here we have used the specific values v=50, i=100 and d=10, ensuring
0 < 2d < v < i. Dˆ, Hˆ and Qˆ have been chosen because these are the strategies that
maximise/minimise a player’s pay-off against Qˆ. This graph shows that Qˆ becomes
the unique best response to itself when γc < γ ≤ pi4 , and is hence an ESS.
We now see that the best response to Qˆ depends on the prepared entanglement in the
system, as demonstrated in figure 2. As Dˆ, Hˆ and Qˆ were found from the turning points
of θ and φ for all γ, we need only compare these three strategies. Clearly
c ≥ c− 4a cos2(γ) sin2(γ) ∀γ (11)
⇒ $R(Qˆ, Qˆ, γ) ≥ $R(Dˆ, Qˆ, γ) ∀γ (12)
as c, a, cos2(γ) and sin2(γ) are all non-negative. However, we only have
$R(Qˆ, Qˆ, γ) ≥ $R(Hˆ, Qˆ, γ) (13)
iff,
c ≥ b cos2(2γ). (14)
This gives the critical point, γc, when c = b cos
2(2γc). So,
γc =
1
2
cos−1
(√
c
b
)
=
1
2
cos−1
(√
1
2
− d
v
)
. (15)
Note that under our original formulation we required 0 < 2d < v to ensure the
game remained intuitive, which implies,
pi
8
< γc <
pi
4
. (16)
As γ ∈ [0, pi/4], this implies (Qˆ, Qˆ) is only an NE iff,
γc ≥ γ ≥ pi
4
. (17)
Note that γc always lies strictly within the range of γ, and hence can always be exceeded.
This is shown in figure 2 where we see that playing Qˆ against Qˆ is only the best choice
of strategy when γc ≤ γ ≤ pi4 .
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By the conditions stated by Maynard Smith & Price (1973), (Qˆ, Qˆ) is also an ESS
in the region γc ≤ γ ≤ pi4 . Indeed, when γ > γc, Qˆ becomes the unique best response to
itself, and is hence an ESS.
As the pay-off received from playing Qˆ against Qˆ is c (the cooperative, non-
aggressive pay-off), this ESS is also Pareto optimal.
3. Summary and conclusions
We have shown that for every intuitive HDG as defined by the conditions 0 < 2d < v < i,
there exists a critical threshold of entanglement, γc ∈ (pi8 , pi4 ), such that when the
entanglement prepared in the initial state exceeds this value, a new Pareto optimal ESS
replaces the old, inefficient, classical ESS when the players are restricted to a specific
two-parameter strategy space.
In other words, for high enough levels of entanglement, populations of self-interested
agents will benefit from being non-aggressive when competing over resources if their
strategy space is restricted to the two-parameter set of unitary operators defined in
equation 3.
Few applications of the quantum HDG are currently known, although Hanauske
et al. (2010) speculate that the quantum HDG may be used in aid of the prevention of
the type of economic crisis observed in 2008.
No known applications of this two-parameter strategy space are known. Hence
it may prove more relevant for practical application to examine this game when both
players are free to apply any quantum operator of their choosing. Under these conditions
it would be interesting to investigate whether we still observe an increase in expected
pay-off at the game’s ESS when compared to the classical result.
This original result gives further insight into the intriguing power of entanglement
and the effect of expanding the strategy spaces available to the players in quantum
games.
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